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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explain why some markets for financial
products take off while others vanish as soon as they have emerged. To this
end, we model an infinite sequence of CAPM–economies in which financial
products can be used for insurance purposes. Agents’ participation in these
financial products, however, is restricted. Consecutive stage economies are
linked by a mapping (“transition function”) which determines the next pe-
riod’s participation structure from the preceding period’s participation. The
transition function generates a dynamic process of market participation which
is driven by the percentage of informed traders and the rate at which a new
asset is adopted. We then analyze the evolutionary stability of stationary
equilibria. In accordance with the empirical literature on financial innovation,
it is obtained that the success of a financial innovation, a mutation, depends
on a sufficiently high trading volume, marketing, and new and differentiated
hedging opportunities. In particular, a set of complete markets forming a sta-
tionary equilibrium is robust with respect to any further financial innovation
while this is not necessarily true for a set of incomplete markets.
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J.E.L. Classification Number: D52, G10, O31.
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“There is no generally accepted theory of financial innovation, but some
broad generalizations of the innovation process are possible. What mat-
ters is not the invention of a financial product or process (which is often
obscure) but its diffusion through the market environment.”
Ted Padolski (1987) in: The New Palgrave on Money and Finance: Fi-
nancial Innovation and Money Supply (p. 68)
1 Introduction
The rapid development and unprecedented growth of international financial markets
over the last two decades2 has become the object of intensive economic research.
Literally every day an abundance of new financial assets is created on these markets;
some of these new securities soon become standard instruments of financial trade,
other ones disappear as quickly as they have emerged. This extensive process of
financial innovation has led to deep structural changes in the scope and range of
international financial markets.
This paper sets out from the claim that the development of financial markets
must be regarded as a fundamentally dynamic process, connecting a series of basic
historical changes. Therefore, we postulate that the analysis of the process of finan-
cial innovation requires treatment within a truly dynamic model.3 As the process of
financial innovation is stimulated by a variety of different reasons, each leading to a
different range of financial products, we think of causes for a specific innovation as
a black box, assuming that, for whatever reason, new assets can perpetually enter
the market. Then we consider an evolutionary selection process which distinguishes
stable asset structures from such asset structures which are likely to be modified by
the innovation of some new financial product.
Building on the applied literature on this topic we assume that a high level
of market participation generated by a certain financial security is one of the key
determinants of its “survival” in the market. This observation has already been
summarized by Black (1986), page 1: “What do we mean by success or failure? A
successful contract innovation attracts a lot of trading interest, draws many people
to the pit and generates substantial order flow from off–the floor participants. On
the other hand, some contracts are introduced, and although a few people stand in
the pit at the exchange, there is not enough interest or orders from other market
participants to continue supporting the contract. The floor traders leave the pit and
the exchange no longer provides floor space or price reports for the contract – it is
a failure.” The empirical literature moreover suggests that the key determinants of
market participation itself are trading volume and liquidity,4 degree of novelty and
2For an assessment see Tufano (1989) and Miller (1992).
3This need for a model describing the ongoing process of financial innovation is one of the main
conclusions of the well known empirical research by Silber (1981) and Black (1986).
4This view is commonly held by applied as well as by theoretical economists (see Black (1986),
Tufano (1989), Miller (1986), Duffie and Rahi (1995) or ‘The Economist’ (1996)). According to
Black (1986) traders prefer to “cross–hedge” the insurance possibilities offered by a new and hence
relatively illiquid asset using well established liquid markets.
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awareness.5
The essential ingredient of our evolutionary model is a standard (static) general
equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets (GEI–model), where investors’
market participation is assumed to be asymmetrically restricted.6 In such a model,
investors are characterized not only by their respective endowments and their pref-
erences (which we assume to be of the CAPM–type), but also by the subset of assets
which they are able to trade on the market. We consider an intertemporal sequence
of these stage economies, where we assume stationarity of all the standard GEI–
characteristics. The proportion of investors trading in certain assets, however, varies
over consecutive periods. This proportion can be interpreted as a “market participa-
tion rate”. Using some transition function, which again is stationary, the evolution
of market participation rates is modeled. Thus, starting from arbitrary initial condi-
tions, an iterative dynamical process is defined allowing an analysis of its stationary
equilibria (fixed points).
First, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary
equilibria, both for the cases of uniform participation and of mixed participation. In
the former case, every asset is used by either everyone or by no one, while in the
latter case there is some asset which is traded by some of the agents but not by all
of them. We then analyze which of the stationary equilibria are robust with respect
to small perturbations of the market participation rates. We investigate whether
some new assets which have not been traded so far (“mutations”) can succeed in
being established in the market. We call stationary equilibria evolutionarily stable if
there is an entry barrier for the participation rates of new assets, below which these
assets will be pushed back out of the market. Moreover, a stationary equilibrium
is called asymptotically stable, if for any sufficiently small perturbation of the cor-
responding market participation rates the dynamical process converges back to the
stationary equilibrium. An asymptotically stable stationary equilibrium thus always
is evolutionarily stable. In our model, the case of complete participation always is
asymptotically stable if it happens to form a stationary equilibrium. Incomplete uni-
form participation phases are evolutionarily stable only with respect to such assets
which do not generate a sufficiently high trading volume, which do not offer suffi-
ciently new and differentiated hedging opportunities, or which are not supported by
an adequate marketing effort.7 Moreover, mixed participation equilibria never are
asymptotically stable in our model.
The issue of financial innovation has recently received a lot of attention in eco-
nomic theory.8 The literature has mainly focused on optimal security design, i.e.
5It is obvious that without being aware of the existence of a certain financial instrument one
cannot trade in that instrument. According to Simon (1955), bounded rationality begins with the
observation that individuals are not aware of all the choices available to them.
6Such models were studied first by Merton (1987), Siconolfi (1986, 1989) and Balasko, Cass and
Siconolfi (1990). Also see Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997).
7The role of marketing in CAPM-economies with restricted participation has previously been
studied by Merton (1987). Similar to our interpretation, Merton considers the restriction in market
participation as a lack of information about the existence of an asset. Merton (1987) then studies
a monopolistic intermediary who chooses the optimal amount of marketing effort which balances
the revenues from additionally informed agents and the cost of marketing.
8For a summary see the survey article by Duffie and Rahi (1995) in the JET Symposium on
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on the innovator’s decision problem, especially in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation. The models presented so far are of an inherently static nature. In general,
only two time periods are considered.9 In the first period, imperfect competition be-
tween financial intermediaries (banks, brokering institutions, exchanges) is modeled,
which determines some endogenous financial market structure. In a second step, this
structure is used as the exogenous market structure for the well–known static GEI–
financial market model. All of these models have to make rather strong assumptions
on innovators’ rationality. In particular, in these models financial intermediaries can
perfectly anticipate every possible consequence of their alternative financial innova-
tions. However, imperfect competition between financial intermediaries is a deep and
very challenging problem, especially if one adds imperfect competition to a general
equilibrium model. In fact, a recent paper by Corcho´n and Mas–Colell (1996) shows
that games with imperfect competition can have indeterminate equilibria even if
the corresponding GE–economy with perfect competition happens to have a unique
equilibrium. We wish to avoid tackling this delicate issue. Instead, we take a com-
plementary point of view by leaving the “obscure” process of asset creation to a
black box and studying the diffusion of assets through the market environment. Yet,
our approach can also serve as a dynamic alternative to the results obtained in the
corresponding static models which depend on rather strong rationality assumptions,
whereas our approach is based on principles of bounded rationality and does not
need to consider intermediaries at all.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in section 2, the static CAPM–economy
with restricted participation is introduced and some useful properties of the stage
economy are derived. Section 3 sets up the evolutionary process and defines corre-
sponding intertemporal equilibrium and stability notions. Section 4 derives our main
results illustrating them by some simple examples. Section 5 concludes the paper by
giving an outlook on further research building on our evolutionary approach.
2 The Stage Economy
2.1 The RPGEI-Model
The first step of our evolutionary approach to financial innovation consists in the
definition of a suitable stationary stage economy. The basis of the financial markets
model at each stage of the evolutionary process is given by the standard GEI–model.
For simplicity we assume that there is only one consumption good, which is divisible
and perishable, and which is interpreted as a composite commodity. Moreover, there
are two periods with uncertainty in the second period, which is modeled by S possible
states s = 1, . . . , S. Hence, consumption takes place on S+1 spot markets indexed by
s = 0 for the first period and by s = 1, . . . , S for the second period. There are I types
of individuals i = 1, . . . , I, where each type consists of a continuum [0, 1] of identical
Financial Innovation and the book by Allen and Gale (1994).
9Models of the type discussed here are used for example in Cuny (1993), Duffie and Jackson
(1989), Heller (1993), Allen and Gale (1994), Bisin (1998), Pesendorfer (1995) and Williamson
(1996).
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agents. Hence, every agent is characterized by a utility–endowment–combination
(U i,ωi) for i ∈ I,
where U i is a utility function mapping IRS+1 into IR and ωi ∈ IRS+1.
Since the main point of this paper is not to investigate the most general allocation
problem, the following rather strong assumption on the individuals’ utility functions
will be made.
Assumption (CAPM): U i : IRS+1 → IR is given by U i(x) = x0 + ∑Ss=1 ρs(xs −
γi
2 (xs)
2), where γi > 0 is the coefficient of type i’s risk aversion.
For the analysis of GEI-economies with objective probabilities ρs > 0 for s =
1, . . . , S, it is convenient to define the ρ-adjusted scalar product in IRS:
$ : IRS × IRS → IR , where x$ y :=
S∑
s=1
xsρsys .
We will later make use of the norm ‖ ·‖ : IRS → IR defined by ‖y‖ := √y $ y, and we
will call any two vectors x, y ∈ IRS “orthogonal” (with respect to ρ) if x$ y = 0.10
In the first period, agents can trade an exogenously given set of assets j ∈ J .
Assets are “real”, i.e. they pay off in units of the single consumption good. They
can be distinguished by their payoff–vectors Aj ∈ IRS. The set of all assets J can
then be viewed as an S × J–matrix, i.e. A = [A1, . . . , AJ ] ∈ IRS×J . The set of assets
J is the set out of which the evolutionary process draws its mutations. We think of
J to be a very large set allowing for all possible constellations of asset markets in
which agents eventually participate. Since trading volume is one of the key driving
forces of the evolutionary process, we will assume that all assets in J have unit
length according to the objective probability measure ρ ∈ IRS++, i.e. ‖Aj‖ = 1 for all
j ∈ J . This normalization allows to give a meaningful definition of trading volume
while not restricting the key characteristic of any GEI–model which is the market
subspace < A >, i.e. the column space of the asset matrix A. Markets will be said
to be “complete” whenever the payoffs of the assets span the entire state space, i.e.
whenever < A >= IRS. Otherwise, markets are incomplete. An asset with payoffs
which are spanned by those of some other assets are called “redundant”. Hence, an
asset Aj is redundant if there is a portfolio θ¯ ∈ IRJ such that Aj = ∑k "=j θ¯kAk.
In the standard GEI–model, every agent is able to trade each available asset.
Here, agents can only use certain subsets of the assets. Considering the enormous
amount of different assets available on today’s financial markets this does not seem
to be an implausible assumption. Especially for the discussion of the emergence of
new assets (innovation), it seems rather reasonable to consider situations where –
to start with – only a small proportion of all the traders are both aware of this
new trading opportunity and prepared to adopt it as a new trading instrument.11
Denoting by θ ∈ IRJ agent i’s asset portfolio and by q ∈ IRJ the vector of asset
10For these definitions and their role in CAPM–economies see for example Magill and Quinzii
(1996, Chapter 3).
11For a motivation of this assumption in the context of financial markets also see Merton (1987).
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prices,12 we therefore consider the following decision problem of an individual agent
of type i who is restricted to trade only such assets j which are contained in a given
subset K ⊂ J of all the assets:13
(P i,KRP ) max
x∈IRS+1
θ∈IRJ
U i(x)
s.t. (x− ωi) =
(−q
A
)
θ
θj = 0 if j /∈ K .
Observe that the definition of (P i,KRP ) implicitly assumes that the budget constraint
(x − ωi) ≤
(−q
A
)
θ is satisfied with equality. This will be the case in equilibrium if
either the market institutions do not allow for free disposal in the second period or if
preferences are monotonic at the equilibrium consumption vector. Such a monotonic-
ity condition can be ensured in the CAPM by choosing sufficiently small coefficients
of individual risk aversion γi > 0 for i ∈ I.14
Due to our assumptions, agents of the same type are distinguished only by the
set K describing the set of assets an individual is able to trade. Therefore, for every
type of agents i ∈ I and every set K ⊂ J one can define the sets J i,K of all agents
of type i who can exactly trade in those assets contained in K. In the sequel, the
economy will be specified such as to ensure that these sets are Borel-measurable for
every i ∈ I and K ⊆ J . Hence, one can define constants pi(K), i ∈ I,K ⊆ J by
pi(K) := Lebesgue−measure (J i,K).
Thus, pi(·) describes the distribution of the awareness restrictions imposed on agents
of type i. Observe that each pi(·) is a measure on P(J) := {K ⊆ J}.
Lacking a clear understanding how various endowment–utility–combinations may
affect market participation of an agent, we make two simplifying assumptions on the
participation structures considered. First, we assume that all types of agents are
identically restricted with respect to their market participation. This assumption will
later allow us to obtain a simple solution for the equilibria of the stage economies.
Assumption (P): There is a p such that p = pi for every i ∈ I.
Secondly, we restrict attention to such participation structures which are com-
pletely characterized by the proportion rj of agents knowing asset j. Since for a
general participation structure p the proportion of agents knowing asset j is given
by
rj =
∑
K⊆J
j∈K
p(K),
12We use the common notation in which prices (quantities) are denoted by row (column) vectors.
13For a decision–theoretic notion of awareness, which can be viewed as a foundation of this
decision problem, see also Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998).
14It is well known, for example, that if markets are complete the assumption 1− γi∑Ik=1 ωks > 0
for every i ∈ I and every s ∈ S suffices to show monotonicity of preferences. Similar conditions can
be found for the case of incomplete markets (see Siwik (2000)).
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we therefore consider the participation structures p ∈ [0, 1]2J for which there exists
a vector r ∈ [0, 1]J such that
pr(K) := p(K) =
∏
k∈K
rk
∏
l /∈K
(1− rl)
for every K ⊆ J . We will denote such probability distributions by pr, r ∈ [0, 1]J ,
in order to indicate the J–dimensional vector of factors corresponding to pr, and
we will frequently refer to the vector r as the “(market) participation structure” or
“participation phase”.15
Besides simplification of analysis, there is one important property of participation
structures described by a phase r ∈ [0, 1]J : In this case the participation rates of each
of the individual assets are mutually uncorrelated in the sense that the knowledge of
some particular asset does not favor the knowledge of any other asset.16 In practice
it might often be the case that information about different assets is not acquired in
such an independent way as postulated here; lacking a clear understanding, however,
how the participation rate in some asset might affect the participation rate in another
asset, this mutual independence seems the most natural assumption to start with.
We will often devote our attention to some relatively simple but important parti-
cipation structures, namely those structures pr where rj ∈ {0, 1} for all assets j ∈ J .
With such a participation structure every agent is considering trading within the
same subset of assets. Such structures are called uniform participation struc-
tures while the other structures are called mixed participation structures. Ob-
serve that uniform participation structures correspond to the standard GEI–situation
without restricted participation.
With these definitions, the characteristics of the stage economies can be summa-
rized as:
RPGEI =
{
IRS+1, A, (U i,ωi)i∈I , (rj)j∈J
}
,
where RPGEI stands for a general equilibrium economy with incomplete markets
and restricted participation.
2.2 RPGEI-Equilibria and Associated Trading Volumes
In an RPGEI-economy, the definition of RPGEI–equilibria can be stated as follows.
Here, the superscript (i,K) for i ∈ I and K ⊆ J is meant to indicate an arbitrary
agent of type i contained in the set J i,K .
Definition 1: A tuple (
∗
x,
∗
θ,
∗
q) ∈ IR(I×2J )×(S+1)× IR(I×2J )×J × IRJ is called a restrict-
ed participation equilibrium with incomplete markets (RPGEI–equilibrium) at a
15It is easy to see that for any r ∈ [0, 1]J the vector pr defined by pr(K) :=∏k∈K rk∏l/∈K(1−rl),
for every K ⊆ J , is in fact a probability measure on the power set P(J). By construction, the set
of all such probability measures can be identified with [0, 1]J . In particular, it follows that this set
is non–empty.
16Consider the indicator variables Xj : P(J) → {0, 1} for j ∈ J with Xj(K) = 1 if and only
if j ∈ K. It can easily be shown that cov[Xj , Xk] = 0 whenever j += k, provided Xj and Xk are
distributed according to a probability measure of the form pr.
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given participation structure r ∈ [0, 1]J if it satisfies the following conditions:17
(i) (
∗
x
i,K
,
∗
θ
i,K
) solves (P i,KRP ) given
∗
q for every (i,K) ∈ I × P(J);
(ii)
∑
i∈I
∑
K⊆J pr(K)·
∗
θ
i,K
= 0, and
(iii)
∑
i∈I
∑
K⊆J pr(K)· ∗x
i,K
=
∑
i∈I ωi,
where pr(K) =
∏
k∈K rk
∏
l /∈K(1− rl) for every K ⊆ J .
The simplifying restrictions placed on the relevant participation structures as
well as the assumption of quadratic utilities allow to explicitly solve for RPGEI–
equilibria. In particular, this is a consequence of the following result which states
that the innovation of a non-redundant asset in the quadratic CAPM does not change
the equilibrium price of the existing assets.18 As a further piece of notation we define
1I := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ IRS, and, for any S + 1-dimensional vector x = (x0, x1, . . . , xS)T ∈
IRS+1, we let x1I := (x1, . . . , xS)T .
Lemma 1 (Market Partition Lemma): Given {A, (U i,ωi)}, for every K ⊆ J
consider the standard GEI–economies parameterized by r, {IRS+1, A, (U i,ωi)Ii=1, r},
where all the agents are restricted to trade exactly in those assets contained in K, i.e.
where rj = 1 for j ∈ K and rj = 0 for j /∈ K. It then follows that,, the equilibrium
asset prices do not vary with K, i.e. that the equilibrium asset prices
∗
q(K) of these
economies satisfy
∗
qj(K) =
∗
qj(K ′) for each j ∈ K ∩K ′.
Proof: Let K ⊆ J be fixed, and consider a GEI-economy where all agents trade
exactly in those assets contained in K. Without loss of generality19 assume that
K = J . Then agent i’s maximization problem can be rewritten as
max
θi∈IRJ
ωi0 − qθi + 1I$ (ωi1I + Aθi)−
γi
2
(ωi1I + Aθ
i)$ (ωi1I + Aθi).
Hence, the first order condition for this problem becomes
1
γi
(1I$ A− q) = (ωi1I + Aθi)$ A.
Summing over types of agents, inserting the equilibrium condition
∑I
i=1
∗
θ
i
= 0, defin-
ing κ :=
∑I
i=1
1
γi and ω1I :=
∑I
i=1 ω
i
1I, and observing the fact that the unboundedness
of the consumption sets guarantees an interior solution, then yields equilibrium prices
∗
q as
∗
q =
(
1I− 1
κ
ω1I
)
$ A .
17Observe that the third condition in Definition 1 is redundant by the definition of the maxi-
mization problem (P i,KRP ).
18This result can, for example, also be found in Oh (1994).
19Note in particular that we do not assume that J forms a complete set of assets.
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But then, obviously,
∗
qj does not depend on the pay-off structure of any asset other
than asset j.
!
From the Market Partition Lemma one concludes that the price of an asset only
depends on preferences and endowments but not on the other assets present in the
economy. This property together with the CAPM -assumption suffices to prove the
existence of a unique RPGEI-equilibrium20 as long as the assets in the economy
are not redundant. In the presence of redundant assets, equilibrium allocations of
consumption bundles still are unique but uniqueness of individual portfolio decisions
obviously can no longer be expected.
Proposition 1: Suppose every agent can only trade in a non–redundant set of assets.
Then there exists a unique RPGEI–equilibrium.
Proof: Stratify the economy into those subeconomies consisting only of agents being
able to trade exactly in the same subset of assets K ⊂ J . By Assumption (P) all those
subeconomies have the same endowment–preference–characteristics (which are just
scaled differently). ¿From the proof of the Market Partition Lemma, it is now clear
that equilibria for these subeconomies exist, that they are unique, and, moreover,
that asset prices are the same across all the subeconomies. Hence, the equilibrium
prices
∗
q of the subeconomies also form an equilibrium price vector for the global
RPGEI–economy.
It remains to show that
∗
q is the unique equilibrium price vector for the RPGEI–
economy. This, however, can be inferred from the monotonicity of the market de-
mand function
θ(q) :=
I∑
i=1
∑
K⊆J
pr(K)θi,K(q)
which is defined on the set of no arbitrage-prices (see Magill and Quinzii (1996)).21 By
assumption (CAPM), utility functions are quasi-linear in first period consumption.
Quasi-linearity of preferences implies monotonicity of individual asset demand func-
tions θi,K (see the first-order condition derived in the proof of the Market Partition
Lemma); and since aggregation preserves this property (see, for example, Hilden-
brand and Kirman (1988)), market demand is, in fact, monotonic in prices in this
economy .
!
For a given participation structure r and an associated RPGEI–equilibrium price
20While for more general preferences existence of an equilibrium can still be proven (see Siconolfi
(1986, 1989) and Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997)), uniqueness of such an equilibrium can no
longer be expected. For a recent overview over uniqueness results for standard GEI-economies see
Hens, Schmedders, and Voss (1999).
21Here, θi,K(q) is the portfolio used in the solution to the maximization problem (P i,KRP ) for given
prices q.
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vector
∗
q(r), let now volij(K, r) := |
∗
θ
i,K
j (r)| be the RPGEI–equilibrium trading volume
in asset j as effected by an agent of type i who is restricted to trade only in those
assets contained in K ⊆ K+(r) := {j ∈ J |rj > 0}.22 For volij(K, r) to be well defined
K+(r) is assumed to be a non-redundant set of assets. Aggregating over types of
agents and all the possible restricting subsets of J , one then obtains total trading
volume in asset j as
vj(r) :=
I∑
i=1
∑
K⊆K+(r)
pr(K) volij(K, r)
=
∑
K⊆K+(p)
pr(K) volj(K, r),
where volj(K, r) :=
I∑
i=1
volij(K, r). It should be noted that the summation can only be
taken over sets contained in K+(r), since for other sets the associated asset demand
is not defined at the participation structure r.
As a consequence of the Market Partition Lemma, the volume function has a
very useful property: The aggregate trading volume of asset j in the population of
agents considering trade in the subset K of assets, i.e. volj(K, r), is independent of
the market participation phase r.
Proposition 2: For each K ⊆ J and for every j ∈ K, there exists a positive
constant αKj such that volj(K, r) = α
K
j for any r ∈ [0, 1]J with K+(r) ⊇ K, where
K+(r) is non-redundant.
Proof: Trading volume volij(K, r) of an individual trader knowing assets contained
in K only depends on the equilibrium prices
∗
q(K). But prices
∗
q(K) are independent
of the participation structure by the previous Market Partition Lemma. Hence,
independently of r (i.e. independently of the relative sizes of the 2J subeconomies
restricted to trade assets in K), equilibrium prices for the RPGEI–economy are
given by
∗
q≡∗q (J). Therefore, αKj := volj(K, r) is constant over r.
!
The simple participation structures considered in this paper then allow for an ex-
plicit characterization of the equilibrium trading volumes in our stage economies. In
order to further simplify notation, we let r\j := (r1, . . . , rj−1, rj+1, . . . , rJ) ∈ [0, 1]J−1.
22Here, similar to the previous footnote,
∗
θ
i,K
(r) is a solution to the maximization problem (P i,KRP )
for given
∗
q(r).
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Corollary 1: For every asset j ∈ J and every participation structure r ∈ [0, 1]J ,
trading volume is linear in rj, i.e. there are constants µj such that vj(r) = µj · rj.
Here, the constants µj are given by
µj := µj(r\j,αj) := µj(r\j, (αKj )K⊆J) :=
∑
K⊆J\{j}
(
∏
k∈K
rk)(
∏
l/∈K
l#=j
(1− rl))αK∪{j}j .
Proof: This follows from the fact that pr(K) = 0 if j /∈ K.
!
Note that µj(r\j,αj) gives the trading volume of asset j generated in the RPGEI–
economy where every agent knows this asset (i.e. rj = 1) and participation in the
other assets is described by r\j. Observe also that the linearity of the volume func-
tion implies that volume is continuously differentiable on the entire set [0, 1]J of
participation phases.
Computing an asset’s trading volume simplifies even further, when the asset
structure is “ρ–orthogonal”.23
Lemma 2: Suppose A = {A1, . . . , AJ} is such that Aj $ Ak = 0 for j += k (“ρ–
orthogonal asset structure”). Then αKj = α
J
j if j ∈ K and αKj = 0 otherwise.
Proof: Recall that κ :=
∑I
i=1
1
γi
and that ω1I denotes aggregate endowments in the
second period. Let AK be the S ×K submatrix of A formed by the column vectors
associated with the assets contained in K. Using the same line of reasoning as in the
proof of the Market Partition Lemma, one can then derive equilibrium asset demand
of a type i–agent trading only K as
∗
θ
i
(K) =
1
γi
(A˜K)−1(AK)
T $ ( 1
κ
ω1I − γiωi1I),
where A˜K = (AK)T $AK . Then ρ–orthogonality of the assets implies that A˜K is the
J-dimensional identity matrix. It follows that
∗
θ
i
j(K) =
1
γi
Aj $ yi
Aj $ Aj =
1
γi
(Aj $ yi) ,
where yi, i ∈ I, is an S–dimensional vector independent of K.
¿From this, we can conclude that θij(K) = θ
i
j(K
′) if j ∈ K ∩K ′, i.e. every agent
being able to trade in asset j will choose to trade the same amount of this asset
independent of the other assets she is allowed to trade in. But then total trading
volume in any asset has to be constant over the different markets associated with
the subsets K ⊆ J .
!
23In Duffie and Jackson (1989), ρ–orthogonal asset structures emerge as the equilibrium outcome.
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In the case of ρ–orthogonal assets, we can therefore determine trading volume by
a very simple formula.
Lemma 3: Suppose A is a ρ–orthogonal asset structure. Then vj(r) = αJj · rj for
every asset j ∈ J and every phase r ∈ [0, 1]J .
Proof: Let r ∈ [0, 1]J . Then
µj(r\j,αj) = αJj
∑
K⊂J\{j}
(
∏
k∈K
rk)(
∏
l/∈K
l#=j
(1− rl)) = αJj ,
where the penultimate equality follows from Lemma 2, and the ultimate one from
simple multinomial algebra.
!
Summarizing this discussion we conclude that in a RPGEI-economy with in-
dividuals characterized by standard CAPM -assumptions, and with a homogeneous
distribution of trading restrictions (Assumption (P)), a unique equilibrium price ex-
ists since then prices are independent of the asset structure (by the Market Partition
Lemma). Moreover, since asset demands in the incomplete market case are projec-
tions of the complete market demands (as can be seen from the proof of Lemma 2),
asset demands also are independent of the asset structure if the assets are orthogonal.
The derivative of the trading volume with respect to the market participation
is the key determinant for the stability of the evolutionary process we consider in
the next section. Therefore, we provide the following two results which conclude the
analysis of the stage economy.
Lemma 4: Let r ∈ [0, 1]J and K+(r) be non-redundant. Then
∂rmvj(r) =
 µj(r\j,αj) if m = jrj ∑K⊂J\{j,m}(∏k∈K rk)(∏ l/∈K
l#=j,m
(1− rl))[αK∪{j,m}j − αK∪{j}j ] if m += j .
Proof: For m = j, the result immediately follows from vj(r) = rj · µj and from the
fact that ∂rjµj = 0 by Corollary 1. If m += j, then ∂rmvj = rj · ∂rmµj. Simple algebra
now yields the formula stated in the Lemma.
!
Corollary 2: Let r ∈ [0, 1]J .
(i) If A is ρ–orthogonal, then the Jacobian of v is a diagonal matrix with diagonal
entries ∂rjvj = α
J
j for every j ∈ J .
(ii) If rj = 0 (i.e. if asset j is not adopted within the economy), then the j-th row
vector of the Jacobian of v is given by the j-th unit vector multiplied by the
positive scalar ∂rjvj = µj(r\j,αj).
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Proof:
(i) For a ρ–orthogonal asset structure we know that αK∪{j,m}j −αK∪{j}j = 0 for any
assets j,m ∈ J . Hence, our claim follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 4.
(ii) This is obvious from Lemma 4. !
This finishes the description of the stage economy.
3 The Evolutionary Process
Having described the one–shot stage economy and having shown that equilibria for
this stage economy do in fact exist and are unique, we now turn our attention to
the evolutionary process generating a sequence of such stage economies, denoted by
RPGEI(t) for t ∈ IIN0. In order to simplify matters as much as possible, all but one
relevant variable are assumed to be stationary. In addition to the invariance of
• RS+1 – the commodity space,
• U i – the utility functions,
• ωi – the endowments,
we also assume stationarity of
• A – the exogenous set of assets
over the time path of the RPGEI–economies. Only individual market participation
(i.e. the phases (r1(t), . . . , rJ(t)) for t ∈ IIN0) will be updated in each period. Two
issues now have to be addressed: how is a phase r(t) translated into a phase r(t+1),
and which are the notions of stationarity and stability to be applied for the analysis of
the resulting dynamical process. Both of these issues are discussed in the remainder
of this section.
3.1 The Transition Function
First the relation between two consecutive time periods has to be established. For
given utility functions and endowments the equilibrium itself only depends on the
market participation. We define a stationary transition function
g : [0, 1]J → [0, 1]J , r(t + 1) = g(r(t))
connecting consecutive time periods which translates the participation phase r(t)
into the participation phase r(t + 1). Hence, as can be inferred from the definition
of g, transition is modeled in a Markovian way, i.e. market participation in period
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t + 1 depends only on the market participation in period t and remains unaffected
by the history of the process in the periods preceding time t.24
We now assume that the transition function gj(r) of any asset j consists of an
awareness coefficient dj(rj) and an adoption coefficient aj(r), i.e. we let
rj(t + 1) = gj(r(t)) = dj(rj(t)) · aj(r(t)) , j ∈ J .
This definition is motivated by the observation that in order to actively trade in
an asset, agents must first become aware of that asset. Consequently, we introduce
the notation dj(rj(t)) for the proportion of agents knowing asset j in period t + 1.
Whether traders being aware of an asset then also actually adopt it (by incorporating
it into their decision problem) will be determined by the perceived attractiveness of
the market as compared to already existing markets. In our model, the coefficient
aj(r(t)) thus denotes the percentage of traders being aware of asset j and adopting
it as a part of their maximization problem in period t + 1.25
To add more structure to the transition function we make explicit assumptions on
the nature of the diffusion of awareness, dj, and the percentage of actual adoption,
aj. First, we assume that dj(rj) is a simple diffusion of information process, i.e.
dj(rj) = rj + mj(1− rj) + wjrj(1− rj) , (0 < mj; 0 ≤ wj; mj + wj ≤ 1).
According to this diffusion process, knowledge about the existence of asset j can
arise from three sources: rj is the percentage of people who remember asset j from
last period,26 (1− rj) is the percentage of previously uninformed agents who might
get informed by public information (mj > 0 is called the “marketing coefficient”) or
by private information (wj ≥ 0 is called the “word of mouth coefficient”). Awareness
of an asset only depends on last period’s awareness of this particular asset, but it is
completely independent of the level of awareness of any of the other assets. Hence,
there are no “spill-over”–effects with respect to the information about the existence
of an asset.
The diffusion process dj(rj) is a simple monotone and strictly concave mapping
from [0, 1] into [0, 1] which has a unique stationary point rj = 1. See Figure 1 (in
Section 7) for an illustration of dj.27
24Note that this dynamic process is well-defined only if the RPGEI-equilibria are known to be
unique (as is the case with the quadratic preferences considered here). With multiple equilibria in
the stage economies, however, the transition process would no longer be well-defined as long as no
explicit equilibrium selection mechanism were introduced.
25The adoption of technical and social innovations has intensively been studied by psychologists
and sociologists. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that adoption is not driven by a ratio-
nal cost–benefit analysis but merely by rules of bounded rationality such as imitation (see Rogers
(1995) and Rogers and Schoemaker (1971)). Following this observation, we do not base the adop-
tion process on a rational cost–benefit analysis which might require anticipating the next period’s
equilibrium (which itself depends on who decides to participate in certain assets).
26Note that here we implicitly assume that agents do not forget.
27Note that in the absence of the adoption coefficient aj the number of people being aware of
the financial innovation will display an S–shaped time–path (upon iteration of our evolutionary
process). This implication of the specification of the diffusion process dj is supported by the
empirical literature on the diffusion of innovations (see Rogers (1995)).
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Whereas dj(rj) is the percentage of agents being aware of asset j, aj is the “adop-
tion coefficient” which determines the percentage of agents being aware of asset j
and actually considering to participate in the market for this asset in the next period
t+1. Again we suggest a simple multiplicative structure: For K+(r) non-redundant
let
aj(r) = min{1, fj(vj(r)) · nj(r)} ,
where fj represents a function measuring the relative “fitness” of an asset, whereas
nj is supposed to reflect the degree of innovation an asset is offering compared to the
other existing assets. As a consequence, this definition of the coefficients aj implies in
general that the transition function for an asset j ∈ J is a non-trivial function of the
entire participation phase r: whereas dj only depends on rj, the adoption coefficients
aj, and hence the transition functions gj, depend on r1, . . . , rJ . Thus the transition
dynamics is inherently multi-dimensional, and there are potential “spill-over”-effects
between the assets.
The concept of fitness of an asset should reflect the expected gains from parti-
cipating in this asset, and we take the trading volume to be an indicator for those
gains.28 To fix ideas we will simply assume that fj(vj) = vj. It should be noted that
the assumed linearity of f will have a considerable effect on the results obtained in
the following section, since it precludes complicated functional forms of the composite
transition function g.
There are at least three arguments made in the literature which support the
assumption that the fitness of a financial asset is positively correlated with the vol-
ume it generates.29 Firstly, trading volume is often interpreted as a proxy for the
liquidity of a financial asset (for a theoretical foundation of this argument see for
example Hopenhayn and Werner (1996) or Pagano (1989a)). Liquid assets are, ce-
teris paribus, considered to be more attractive to investors than illiquid ones for
three reasons: They can better be realized at short notice (Grossmann and Miller
(1988)), they are subject to a reduced influence of strategic behaviour – which can
either be due to asymmetric information as in Kyle (1985, 1989) or Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988), or due to imperfect competition as in Pagano (1989a) – and they
are less volatile (see for example Pagano (1989b)). Secondly, a number of studies
have stressed that trading volume is a major factor governing the actions of finan-
cial intermediaries. Such intermediaries, for example exchanges or brokers, are often
(directly or indirectly) compensated by some form of transaction fees which are pro-
portional to the trading volume; hence, these intermediaries attempt to find and to
promote such financial assets which generate high trading volumes. For models in
support of this argument see for example Duffie and Jackson (1989), Cuny (1993),
Hara (1995), or Bisin (1999).30 Finally, a third argument can be made in favor of
interpreting an asset’s trading volume as its fitness: As Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
28Obviously, if the preceding trading volume was zero, then no trader was able to gain anything
on that market. Moreover, the higher the trading volume the more gains, in general. Hence, the
fitness function should be starting at 0 and being monotonically increasing
29Black (1986) even defines the success of a financial innovation by the trading volume attracted.
30Observe that – in order to keep things separate – we have not incorporated this effect into the
“marketing coefficient” mj (which we assumed to be exogenous and fixed), but that we have rather
amalgamated all volume-related effects into the adoption coefficient aj .
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and Welch (1998) have pointed out, herding behaviour is an important phenomenon
in the presence of bounded knowledge and asymmetric information. In this sense,
high trading volume can here be interpreted as a signal that an asset is widely and
successfully used, and which therefore attracts new consumers who had so far not
adopted this asset.
Finishing the specification of the transition function, the factor nj(r) is supposed
to measure the degree of innovation in the payoffs of asset j relative to the assets
already established. To be more precise, let a participation rate r be given and
assume that K+(r) forms a non-redundant set of assets. Then one can decompose
the payoff Aj for any asset j ∈ J into a spanned component Sj and an innovation
component Ij, i.e. Aj ≡ Ij + Sj, where Sj is the ρ–orthogonal projection of Aj onto
the span of the assets already traded at r. Say Sj =
∑
k∈K+(r)\{j} Akθk, where θ¯ is
defined as the unique solution to the optimization problem
min
θ∈IRK+(r),θj=0
‖Aj −
∑
k∈K+(r)\{j}
Akθk‖ .
In the sequel we will assume that this “innovation” coefficient has the following
simple shape:
nj(r) =
√
||Ij||2 + βj(r)||Sj||2,
where βj(r) =
rj
rj+
∑
k∈K+(r)\{j} rk|θk|
if the denominator is different from zero, and
βj(r) = 1 otherwise.
For a motivation of this specific assumption on nj observe that in a model with
restricted participation the degree of “innovativeness” of an asset depends on two
factors: On the one hand, and as acknowledged by the literature on financial in-
novation,31 it depends on the level to which asset j contributes to the spanning
opportunities available in the economy. On the other hand, the degree of novelty
of an asset depends on the relative participation in asset j compared to the partici-
pation in the other assets. This has already been pointed out by Black (1986) who
stresses that the availability of well-established “cross-hedging” opportunities for a
new asset is one of the major reasons for the failure of this asset. Our formulation of
the function nj therefore measures the “spanning factor” by ‖Ij‖, and captures the
“cross-hedging” factor by introducing the coefficient β.
Regarding the properties of the function nj, note that βj ∈ [0, 1] and hence
nj ∈ [0, 1] by our normalization assumption ||Aj|| = 1 for all j ∈ J . Moreover,
nj is non-decreasing in rj and continuously differentiable in r.32 Furthermore, for
a ρ–orthogonal asset Aj, it is obtained that nj = 1 for all rj ∈ [0, 1]. Finally,
if Aj has zero participation and is redundant to some assets with positive market
participation, then nj = 0. These properties of nj are, in fact, the only properties
which will be used to derive our general results. The examples given in subsection
4.2 are computed using the specific function nj defined above.
31See for example Duffie and Jackson (1989).
32Observe that θ is a function of A, but does not depend on r.
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3.2 Notions of Stationarity and Stability
We now first have to look for steady states of the evolutionary process. These are
captured by the following notion of a fixed point of the transition mapping defined
by g. Our notion of stationarity thus describes a situation of market participation
rates (and trading volumes) that sustain themselves over time, allowing for both high
participation in some assets and low participation in other assets.
Definition 2: A participation phase r ∈ [0, 1]J is a stationary equilibrium of the
evolutionary process if r = g(r).
¿From the definition of the transition function g it is obvious that r = (0, . . . , 0)
always is a stationary equilibrium.
We continue by investigating the stability of stationary equilibria by analyzing
which set of assets is robust with respect to some ongoing process of financial in-
novations. First, we define stability of a set of assets with respect to the further
introduction of new assets, i.e. financial innovations.
Definition 3: A stationary equilibrium r ∈ [0, 1]J is evolutionarily stable with respect
to the innovation of asset j if rj = 0 and if there exists some εj ∈ (0, 1) such that
for every r˜j ∈ (0, εj) the sequence r(t+1) = g(r(t)), with r(0) = (r\j, r˜j),t = 0, 1, . . .
converges to r. Moreover, a stationary participation phase is evolutionarily stable
if it is evolutionarily stable with respect to any innovation.
Thus, a stationary participation structure is evolutionarily stable if the traded
assets can be protected from “mutants” by certain entry barriers for the initial pro-
portion of traders participating in the new asset markets. Note that if the uniform
participation phase r = (1, . . . , 1) is a stationary equilibrium, it is also evolutionarily
stable since no more entrants can appear.
Similarly, we ask whether some asset market “remains perfect”, i.e. whether an
asset market with complete participation has a tendency to return to the situation
of complete participation if its participation rate is reduced slightly below 1.
Definition 4: A stationary participation phase r ∈ [0, 1]J remains perfect with
respect to asset j if rj = 1 and if there exists some εj ∈ (0, 1) such that for every
r˜j ∈ (1 − εj, 1) the sequence r(t + 1) = g(r(t)), with r(0) = (r\j, r˜j), t = 0, 1, . . .
converges to r. Moreover, a stationary participation phase remains perfect if it
remains perfect with respect to any asset.
A stronger stability requirement than evolutionary stability and remaining perfect
is given by
Definition 5: A stationary participation phase r ∈ [0, 1]J is asymptotically stable
if there exists some ε > 0 such that for every r˜ ∈ [0, 1]J with ||r˜−r|| < ε the sequence,
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r(t + 1) = g(r(t)) with r(0) = r˜, t = 0, 1, . . . converges to r.
Note that participation structures which are asymptotically stable also are evolu-
tionarily stable and remain perfect for every asset j while the opposite implication in
general fails to hold. The concepts differ, since evolutionary stability and remaining
perfect only require robustness with respect to changes in the participation rates of
single assets while asymptotic stability considers small deviations from the market
participation rate in any possible direction.
4 Main results
4.1 Analytical Results
We first introduce specific one-dimensional functions hj for every j ∈ J , which serve
to greatly simplify much of the following exposition. In fact, for every j ∈ J and for
every (fixed) r\j ∈ [0, 1]J−1 we define
hj(rj) := gj(r\j, rj)
=
{
dj(rj) · nj(r) · µj(r\j,αj) · rj if µj(r\j,αj)nj(r)rj < 1
dj(rj) otherwise
.
Thus hj is the one-dimensional function governing the dynamics of rj if the par-
ticipation rates,r\j, of the other assets were to be kept fixed. It will turn out in the
sequel that in spite of the potential spill-over effects present in the economy (due
to the construction of nj and µj which may depend on the entire vector r), all the
results for the existence and stability of stationary points derived below can be de-
duced from the shape of hj. The following lemma shows that – except for irregular
cases – hj essentially takes three possible shapes, which are depicted in Figure 2 (see
Section 7).
Lemma 5: Let j ∈ J and r\j ∈ [0, 1]J−1 be given, and let µj = µj(r\j,αj). Then
hj(rj) := gj(r\j, rj) has the following properties:
(i) hj(0) = 0. Furthermore, hj(1) = 1 only if nj(r\j, 1)µj ≥ 1.
(ii) If nj(r\j, 1)µj < 1 then hj(rj) < rj for every rj ∈ (0, 1] and h′j(0) < 1.
(iii) If nj(r\j, 1)µj > 1 and mjnj(r\j, 0)µj > 1 then hj(1) = 1, h′j(0) > 1, and
hj(rj) > rj for all rj ∈ (0, 1).
(iv) If nj(r\j, 1)µj > 1 and mjnj(r\j, 0)µj < 1 then hj(1) = 1, h′j(0) < 1, and there
exists a unique rj ∈ (0, 1) such that hj(rj) = rj. Moreover, in this case, hj is
differentiable at rj and h′j(rj) > 1.
Proof:
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(i) This follows directly from inserting rj = 0 and rj = 1 into the definition of hj.
(ii) In this case
hj(1) = dj(1)nj(r\j, 1)µj < 1,
hence hj ends below the diagonal. Since therefore
hj(rj) ≤ dj(rj)nj(r\j, rj)µj · rj ≤ dj(1)nj(r\j, 1)µj · rj < rj,
it follows that hj never crosses the diagonal in the open interval (0, 1). More-
over, one easily computes the derivative at rj = 0 as
h′j(0) = dj(0)nj(r\j, 0)µj < dj(0) = mj ≤ 1.
(iii) Here, hj(1) = dj(1) = 1 by construction. Now consider the function h˜j defined
as
h˜j(rj) := dj(rj)nj(r\j, rj)µj(r\j,αj)
for every rj ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, h˜j is strictly increasing, since dj is strictly
increasing and nj is non-decreasing. Under the assumptions stated it fol-
lows that h˜j(0) > 1. Hence, h˜j(rj) > 1 for every rj ∈ [0, 1]. Noting that
hj(rj) = min{h˜j(rj) · rj, dj(rj)} > rj for every rj ∈ (0, 1), then proves that hj
cannot cross the diagonal in the open interval (0, 1).
Furthermore, the assumptions imply that h′j(0) = mjnj(r\j, 0)µj > 1.
(iv) Again, hj(1) = dj(1) = 1 follows by construction. Now, for the function h˜j
defined above, one obtains that h˜j(0) < 1 and h˜j(1) > 1. Hence, due to the
strict monotonicity of h˜j, there must be a unique point rj ∈ (0, 1) such that
h˜j(rj) = 1. But in this case hj(rj) = h˜j(rj) · rj = rj, and rj is unique in (0, 1)
as claimed.
In the case considered, the derivative of hj at rj = 1 satisfies h′j(1) < 1. But
then, at rj, hj must cross the diagonal from below. Since dj(rj) > rj implies
aj(rj) < 1, it follows that hj is differentiable at rj. Hence, h′j(rj) > 1.
!
To see what is driving this result consider the role of aj: Either it never becomes
constant, then hj is stationary only in rj = 0. If, however, it does become constant
then, in a neighborhood of rj = 1, hj is identical with dj which has a simple shape
and which strictly lies aboves the diagonal.
Therefore, Lemma 5 completely characterizes the possible shapes of hj in all the
cases where mjnj(r\j, 0)µj += 1 and nj(r\j, 1)µj += 1 (“regularity conditions”). Since
we are only concerned with phases r\j which are part of a stationary equilibrium,
it suffices to show that these regularity conditions are met for all stationary points.
As the next proposition demonstrates, this is in fact true for almost all endowments
ω = (ω1, . . . ,ωI) ∈ IR(S+1)I .
Lemma 6: For all endowment distributions, except for some set C ⊂ IR(S+1)I of
Lebesque-measure zero, the regularity conditions mjnj(r\j, 0)µj += 1 and nj(r\j, 1)µj +=
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1, where µj = µj(r\j,αj), hold at all stationary equilibria r ∈ [0, 1]J with K+(r) form-
ing a non–redundant set of assets.
Proof:33 Let r ∈ [0, 1]J be a stationary equilibrium. As in the Market Partition
Lemma, consider the GEI–economies GEI(r,K) = {IR(S+1), A(r,K), (U i,ωi)Ii=1},
where A(r,K) is a submatrix of A, consisting only of assets j ∈ K ⊆ K+(r) with
positive participation rates. Equilibrium trading volumes are
∗
θ
i
(ω) =
1
γi
(A(r,K)T $ A(r,K))−1A(r,K)T $ ( 1
κ
ω1I − γiωi1I) , i = 1, . . . , I ,
where κ =
∑I
i=1
1
γi and ω1I =
∑I
i=1 ω
i
1I. Hence,
∗
θ
i
(ω) is a continuously differentiable
function for ω ∈ IR(S+1)I and rank ∂ω
∗
θ
i
(ω) = |K|, i.e. ∗θ
i
(ω) is “controllable” by
ω. Hence, by the parametric transversality theorem, for all ω except for a set C of
measure zero,
∗
θ
i
j (ω) += 0 so that the aggregate trading volume αKj (ω) =
∑I
i=1 |
∗
θ
i
j (ω)|
is continuously differentiable and controllable by ω, i.e. rank ∂ω(αK1 (ω), . . . ,α
K
J (ω)) =
|K|.
Therefore, for all ω, except for a set of measure zero, nj(r)µj(r\j,αKj ) += 1 for all
j ∈ J and for all K ⊆ K+(r). A similar argument can be applied for the second
regularity condition mjnj(r\j, 0)µj(r\j,αKj ) += 1, noting that nj is continuously dif-
ferentiable in r\j.
!
The stability properties of the evolutionary process are determined by the eigen-
values of the Jacobian of the transition function g : [0, 1]J → [0, 1]J evaluated at
the stationary equilibria. Therefore, we need to clarify whether g is differentiable at
every stationary phase r ∈ [0, 1]J , where, as has been noted before, for stationary
phases in the boundary of [0, 1]J the derivative has to be taken only in any direction
pointing to the interior of [0, 1]J . Note that the transition function g need not be
differentiable at a point where njvj = 1.
Proposition 3: For all endowment distributions, except for some set C of measure
zero, the transition function g : [0, 1]J → [0, 1]J is continuously differentiable at all
stationary equilibrium phases r ∈ [0, 1]J with K+(r) forming a non–redundant set of
assets.
Proof: By construction, dj(rj) and nj(r) are continuously differentiable. Corollary
1 has demonstrated that the volume function vj(r) is continuously differentiable
as well. Hence, it remains to argue that, generically in endowments, nj(r)vj(r) =
nj(r)µj(r\j,αj)rj += 1 for all stationary equilibria r under consideration. Now gj(r) =
rj and nj(r)vj(r) = 1 imply dj(rj) = rj and, hence, rj = 1. Therefore, the claim
follows as a corollary from the previous lemma.
!
33This proof uses some parametric transversality theorems (for a precise statement and a thorough
discussion thereof see Magill and Quinzii (1996)).
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After these preliminaries we can characterize stationary equilibria r in terms of
properties of their coordinates rj for j ∈ J .
Theorem 1: Suppose K+(r\j, 1) forms a non–redundant set of assets, and let r be
a stationary equilibrium. Let µj = µj(r\j,αj). Then
(i) rj = 1 only if nj(r)µj ≥ 1.
(ii) Moreover, at r, let the economy satisfy the regularity conditions, i.e. let
mjnj(r\j, 0)µj += 1 and nj(r\j, 1)µj += 1. Then rj ∈ (0, 1) only if
nj(r\j, 0)µjmj < 1 < nj(r\j, 1)µj .
Such a mixed participation phase is unique in (0, 1).
Proof: A stationary equilibrium r ∈ [0, 1]J is a solution to the equation r = g(r),
where gj(r) = min{1, nj(r)µjrj}dj(rj) for all j = 1, . . . , J . Hence, if r is a stationary
equilibrium, then hj(rj) = rj for every j ∈ J (where r\j is held fixed). But then, the
statements in the theorem follow directly from Lemma 5.
!
¿From Theorem 1, we get simple conditions for the stationarity of the two ex-
tremal participation structures, zero participation and complete participation in all
assets, respectively.
Corollary 3:
(i) r = (0, . . . , 0) always is a stationary equilibrium.
(ii) For any non–redundant set of assets K ⊆ J , a phase r ∈ [0, 1]J with rj = 1 for
every j ∈ K is a stationary equilibrium only if nj(r)vj(r) ≥ 1 for every j ∈ K.
Moreover if nj(r)vj(r) ≥ 1 for every j ∈ K and rj = 0 for every j /∈ K then r
is a stationary equilibrium.
(iii) Let A be ρ–orthogonal. Then, for any non–redundant set of assets K ⊂ J , a
phase r ∈ [0, 1]J with rj = 1 for every j ∈ K is a stationary equilibrium if and
only if αJj ≥ 1. Moreover, rj ∈ (0, 1) is part of a stationary equilibrium only if
αJj mj < 1, and α
J
j rj < 1 in which case rj is unique.
Proof: Parts (i) and (ii) are obvious from Lemma 5 and Theorem 1. To see (iii)
observe that if A is ρ–orthogonal, then nj(r) = 1 by construction and µj(r\j,αj) = αJj
by the proof of Lemma 3. Hence nj(r)µj = αJj .
!
In order to determine the stability properties of stationary equilibria, we now
compute the derivative of the transition function:
Lemma 7: For any stationary equilibrium r ∈ [0, 1]J with K+(r) non-redundant and
for almost all endowments ω we get:
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(i) If rj ∈ {0, 1} then ∂rjgj(r) =
{
mjnj(r)µj(r\j,αj) if rj = 0
1−mj − wj if rj = 1 .
(ii) If rj ∈ {0, 1} and k += j then ∂rkgj(r) = 0.
(iii) If rj ∈ (0, 1) then ∂rjgj(r) > 1.
Proof: Recall that gj(r) = dj(r)aj(r), where dj(rj) = rj +mj(1− rj)+wjrj(1− rj)
and aj(r) = min{1, nj(r)vj(r)} for every j ∈ J .
Compute
∂rkgj(r) = ∂rkaj(r)dj(rj) + aj(r)∂rkdj(rj) ,
where ∂rkaj(r) = ∂rknj(r)vj(r) + nj(r)∂rkvj(r) if nj(r)vj(r) < 1
and ∂rkaj(r) = 0 if nj(r)vj(r) > 1 , k, j ∈ J .
(i): Suppose k = j and rj = 0. Then aj(r) = 0 since vj(r) = 0. Moreover, for the
same reason ∂rjaj(r) = nj(r)∂rjvj(r). By Lemma 4, ∂rjvj(r) = µj(r\j,αj). Hence,
∂rjgj(r) = mjnj(r)µj(r\j,αj).
On the other hand, suppose k = j and rj = 1. Then aj(r) = 1 and nj(r)vj(r) =
nj(r)µj > 1 by Theorem 1 (i), so that ∂rjaj(r) = 0. Hence, ∂rjgj(r) = 1−mj − wj.
(ii): Suppose k += j. Then, ∂rkdj(rj) = 0, since dj only depends on rj. If
nj(r)vj(r) > 1, then ∂rkaj(r) = 0. If nj(r)vj(r) < 1, then aj(r) < 1 and since r is a
stationary equilibrium with rj ∈ {0, 1}, it must follow that rj = 0 by Theorem 1 (i).
But then, vj(r) = 0 and, by Lemma 4, ∂rkvj(r) = 0, hence ∂rkgj(r) = 0.
(iii): Suppose rj ∈ (0, 1) is part of the stationary equilibrium. Observe that
∂rjgj(r) = h
′
j(rj) where r\j = (r1, . . . , rj−1, rj+1, . . . , rJ) is held fixed. Then Theorem
1 (ii) and Lemma 5 (iv) imply that ∂rjgj(r) > 1.
!
The stability properties of stationary equilibria are derived from Lemma 7 by
application of some well known results of the Theory of Dynamical Systems. A
stationary equilibrium is asymptotically stable if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of
the transition function evaluated at the stationary point have absolute value less than
1 (see, for example, Devaney (1986)). Moreover, a stationary uniform participation
phase is evolutionarily stable with respect to the mutation of a new asset if the
diagonal entry corresponding to this mutation has absolute value less than 1. This
condition for evolutionary stability follows from Lemma 7. Consider a stationary
point with rk = 0. Since by Lemma 7, ∂rkgj(r) = 0 for all j with rj ∈ {0, 1}, the
Jacobian matrix ∂rg is a diagonal matrix at any uniform participation phase, and
therefore, in a small neighborhood around r, the derivative of g in the direction of
k is given by ∂rjgj(r). A similar argument applies for the stability with respect to
small reductions of participation levels below 1, i.e. for an asset’s property to remain
perfect.
Therefore, we get the following stability properties:
Theorem 2: At any stationary equilibrium r ∈ {0, 1}J with K+(r) non–redundant,
and for almost all endowments ω,
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(i) r is evolutionarily stable with respect to the innovation of a non-redundant asset
j +∈ K+(r) if mjnj(r)µj < 1.
(ii) r is not evolutionarily stable with respect to the innovation of a non-redundant
asset j /∈ K+(r) if mjnj(r)µj > 1.
(iii) If rj = 1 then asset j remains perfect .
Moreover any stationary equilibrium r with rj ∈ (0, 1) for some j ∈ J is not asymp-
totically stable.
Proof: First assume that r ∈ {0, 1}J . Then, by part (ii) of Lemma 7, the directional
derivative of g in the k-th direction is given by the k-th diagonal element of ∂rg(r).
Hence, part (i) of Lemma 7 together with Lemma 5 gives the stability conditions
(i),(ii), and (iii).
To show the last statement assume that r is stationary and that there is some
k ∈ J such that rk ∈ (0, 1). Recall from elementary linear algebra that the trace
of a matrix is equal to the sum of its eigenvalues. Part (ii) of Lemma 7 implies for
every j ∈ J with j ∈ {0, 1} that the j–th unit vector is a left eigenvector of ∂rg(r)
with corresponding eigenvalue ∂rjgj(r). Since furthermore ∂rkgk(r) > 1 for k with
rk ∈ (0, 1), at least one eigenvalue of ∂rg(r) must be greater than one. Hence r is
not asymptotically stable. !
Moreover, as the next theorem shows, a stationary equilibrium with full par-
ticipation in a complete set of markets is not only evolutionarily stable but also
asymptotically stable. If the economy happens to settle in a complete set of markets
it cannot be unsettled by small perturbations to the participation rates.
Theorem 3: Any stationary equilibrium r ∈ {0, 1}J with K+(r) forming a non–
redundant and complete set of markets is asymptotically stable.
Proof: To demonstrate asymptotic stability first note that by Lemma 7, ∂rg(r) is
a diagonal matrix because by assumption of Theorem 3 for all j ∈ J either rj = 0
or rj = 1. Hence locally the transition function g decomposes into J independent
functions. Therefore r is asymptotically stable if every j ∈ K+(r) remains perfect
and if r is evolutionarily stable with respect to any j /∈ K+(r). The former is indeed
the case because for r = 1 the j-th diagonal element is 1−mj − wj which is smaller
than one. The latter requires to extend g on a neighborhood of r to redundant
assets. Such an extension which keeps the utility maximization property of asset
demand and which does not destroy the differentiability of g is always possible, as
the following simple example demonstrates.
Let J˜ be such that J˜ ∩K+(r) = ∅ be a set of possible financial innovations, each
of which is redundant to K+(r),i.e.
Aj =
∑
k∈K+(r)
Akθ
j
k, j ∈ J˜
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Now with reference to Definition 3 consider the recursion
rk(t + 1) = rk −
∑
j∈J˜
θ
j
k, rj(t),with rk(0) = rk, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , k ∈ K+(r),
rj(t + 1) = 1/(t + 1)rj(0),with rj(0) = εj, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , j ∈ J˜ .
Note that limt→∞ = r. Finally note that for any such extension r is evolutionarily
stable because the innovation coefficient, nj(r), is zero for all j /∈ K+(r). Hence, r is
indeed asymptotically stable.
!
Finally, in the case of ρ–orthogonal assets the criterion for evolutionary stability
is independent of the particular equilibrium.
Corollary 4: Let the assets be ρ–orthogonal. Then a stationary equilibrium r ∈
[0, 1]J with K+(r) non–redundant is evolutionarily stable with respect to the innova-
tion of asset j /∈ K+(r) if αJj mj < 1. If αJj mj > 1, then r is not evolutionarily stable
with respect to the innovation of asset j. Moreover, r is asymptotically stable if and
only if it is evolutionarily stable.
Proof: By construction nj(r) = 1 for all j ∈ J if assets are ρ–orthogonal. Moreover,
by Lemma 3, the equilibrium volume of trade of any asset is independent of the other
assets’ market participation. Hence, ∂rg(r) is a diagonal matrix, and its stability
properties then are determined by its diagonal entries.
!
The simple stability properties of stationary equilibria derived in Theorem 2,
Theorem 3, and in Corollary 4 rely on two particular features of the transition
process:
Firstly, whenever a stationary equilibrium r corresponds to a standard GEI-
economy, i.e. whenever r ∈ {0, 1}, then r can locally be characterized by the one-
dimensional dynamics described by hj for every j ∈ J . In particular, the stability of
r only depends on the slope of hj at rj = 0 and rj = 1. The derivative h′j(0) depends
on the marketing coefficient mj, the coefficient of asset j’s trading volume µj(r\j,αj),
and the degree of asset j’s “innovativeness” nj(r\j, 0). If, for example, there is no
marketing effort,34 i.e. mj small , or if asset j is almost redundant (nj small) or if it
does not generate a sufficiently high trading volume (µj is small), then evolutionary
stability with respect to asset j follows, i.e. asset j is a “failure”. On the other
hand, the derivative h′j(1) will always be smaller than 1 since if rj = 1 is a part of a
stationary equilibrium then hj necessarily is identical to dj in a neighborhood of 1 (for
“regular economies”, i.e. for almost all endowments), where d′j(1) = 1−mj−wj < 1.
34It is commonly found in the empirical literature that marketing is among the key factors
that distinguishes top performing products in financial services (see Cooper, Easingwood, Edgett,
Kleinschmidt and Storey (1994)).
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But the fact that the cross-derivatives do not matter in this case (Lemma 7 (ii))
implies that asset j must be remaining perfect. Hence, any small reduction of market
participation rates of assets in which there is full participation in the stationary
equilibrium will lead back to full participation.
Secondly, the economy cannot get stuck in a situation of mixed market parti-
cipation, where potential spill-over effects might become relevant (i.e. where the
cross-derivatives can be non-zero): In such a situation, eventually, and after any
perturbation, every asset will either be adopted by the entire economy or it will
disappear. As can be seen from the proof of Lemma 7 (iii), this instability is im-
plied by the important fact from linear algebra that the trace of a matrix is equal
to the sum of its eigenvalues. Based on this observation, the lack of stability of
mixed participation equilibria can be deduced from the shape of the one-dimensional
functions hj – in spite of the fact that the transition function is multi-dimensional
in any neighborhood around the mixed participation equilibrium. As a consequence,
the “standard” GEI-economies are the only stable stationary outcomes of the dy-
namical process modeled in this paper, and they are characterized by simple, locally
one-dimensional, dynamics.
Obviously, the simplicity of the results achieved depends on the restrictiveness
of the assumptions made. If any of the assumptions were relaxed then an explicit
characterization of the transition dynamics would soon become inherently difficult.
In this case, one would have to turn towards computer simulations and numerical
analysis. We have used such methods already in the situation considered in this pa-
per, in order to further illustrate our model by means of some interesting examples.
We will present these examples in the following subsection.35 Besides illustrating the
general predictions of our model and indicating a potential approach to more diffi-
cult specifications of the stage economies and the transition process, the simulation
program also allows to derive new results. Whereas, for example, our results in the
general model characterize the local stability of stationary equilibria, the simulation
program allows to visualize the basins of attraction of stationary equilibria which
often turn out to be much larger than some small ε–neighborhood. Moreover, the
simulation program allows to show the trajectories of the dynamical process, starting
at arbitrary initial values. These trajectories display some interesting non–monotonic
dynamics which could not have been concluded from our general results.
4.2 Numerical Examples
The examples presented in this section illustrate the case of “nuts and bolts”, the
possibility of stationary mixed participation equilibria, the phenomenon of “path–
dependence”, and, finally, the possibility that an initially successful asset is later
driven out of the market by some other, even more successful asset.
The first example illustrates the famous case of “nuts and bolts”. Hart (1979)
has suggested an example, where a coordination failure between innovating interme-
35The examples are obtained from a simulation program written by our research assistant Jan
Pilgrim. The program is based on the simulation program macrodyn created in the research group
of Volker Bo¨hm and described in Bo¨hm and Schenk–Hoppe´ (1998). We are grateful for this support.
26
diaries may lead to an inefficient outcome of the innovation process. In a different
framework, Hart’s example is repeated by Heller (1993) and by Che and Rajan
(1994). The idea behind this example can be described as follows. Suppose there
are two market makers who can open a market for a certain asset at some fixed
cost. Market makers recover these fixed costs through transaction costs they charge
for each unit of the asset traded. Suppose furthermore that the two assets possibly
traded on the two markets are complements with respect to trading volume. In that
case, every asset generates a low trading volume if introduced while the market for
the other asset remains closed; if both markets are opened simultaneously, however,
then trading volume in both assets will be high. Hart (1979), Heller (1993), and
Che and Rajan (1994) now point out that if fixed costs for the opening of a market
are sufficiently high, both market makers may prefer to keep their market closed
because each market maker expects the other one to do so. Due to this coordination
failure the economy might therefore get stuck in the inefficient no trade–equilibrium
without any available assets. For obvious reasons, this example is usually referred
to as the “nuts and bolts”–example.
In our example two assets can be complementary in such a way that the innova-
tion of only one of them is not successful. In our model, however, both assets only
get started if they are introduced simultaneously and with a level of participation
which exceeds a certain threshold in the open interval (0, 1).36 Note that this inter-
esting aspect of financial innovation cannot be analyzed in the traditional “nuts and
bolts”–examples since innovating in these models means to increase participation
rates abruptly from zero to one.
The characteristics of the economy in our version of the “nuts-and-bolts”-example
are given by:
Example 1: I = 2, J = 2, S = 2, ρ1 = 0.5, ρ2 = 0.5, γ1 = 0.6, γ2 = 0.4,
ω1 = (1,
√
2, 0.125)T , ω2 = (1, 0.125,
√
2)T , A1 = (1, 1)T , A2 = (0,
√
2)T , m1 = 1,
m2 = 1, w1 = 0, w2 = 0.
Figure 3a shows the basins of attraction for Example 1, while Figure 3b shows
trajectories of the dynamical process implied by Example 1.37
Figure 3a, see section 7.
Figure 3b, see section 7.
The next example shows the possibility of a mixed participation equilibrium. The
characteristics of the economy in Example 2 are:
36In Example 1, introducing both assets with participation rates r1(0) = r2(0) = 0.25 suffices to
get both markets started, whilst choosing r1(0) = r2(0) = 0.2 will cause both assets to eventually
die out.
37In these and the following figures, the horizontal (vertical) axis displays the participation rate
of the first asset, i.e. r1 (the participation rate of the second asset, i.e. r2). Different basins of
attraction are shaded differently. Finally, trajectories read as moving from dot to dot.
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Example 2: I = 2, J = 2, S = 3, ρ1 = 1/3, ρ2 = 1/3, ρ3 = 1/3, γ1 = 0.4, γ2 = 0.3,
ω1 = (1, 2, 0, 0)T , ω2 = (1, 0, 0, 2)T , A1 = (
√
1.5,−√1.5, 0)T , A2 = (0,
√
0.6,
√
2.4)T ,
m1 = 0.5, m2 = 0.5, w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.4.
In Figure 4a there is a mixed equilibrium at the point where the basins of attrac-
tion of the four uniform participation equilibria “kiss” each other. Figure 4b nicely
illustrates the instability of the mixed participation equilibrium. Note that there are
mixed participation equilibria also at r = (r1, 0) and r = (0, r2). These stationary
equilibria are not asymptotically stable since slight variations in own participation
cause the participation phase to divert from them (as predicted by Theorem 2), mov-
ing either towards full or zero participation. In this case, these mixed participation
equilibria on the boundary also are evolutionarily unstable.38
Figure 4a, see section 7
Figure 4b, see section 7
Example 3 illustrates the phenomenon of “path dependence” or “lock-in” which
often occurs in evolutionary models with network externalities (see, for example,
Arthur (1989) or David (1993)). If the innovation path were started with the intro-
duction of asset 1 (asset 2), it would end at the stationary point in which only asset
1 (asset 2) is traded.
The characteristics of Example 3 are:
Example 3: I = 2, J = 2, S = 3, ρ1 = 1/3, ρ2 = 1/3, ρ3 = 1/3, γ1 = 0.4, γ2 = 0.3,
ω1 = (1, 2, 0, 0)T , ω2 = (1, 0, 0, 2)T , A1 = (
√
1.5,−√1.5, 0)T , A2 = (0,
√
0.6,
√
2.4)T ,
m1 = 0.7, m2 = 0.7, w1 = 0.3, w2 = 0.3.
Figure 5a shows the corresponding basins of attraction while Figure 5b displays
some trajectories.
Figure 5a, see section 7.
Figure 5b, see section 7.
The last example illustrates how an asset can be driven out of the market even
though every asset “remains perfect” (see Theorem 2). This can happen if a station-
ary equilibrium is not evolutionarily stable with respect to the innovation of some
new asset, and if, in the presence of the new asset, some of the former assets do no
longer generate sufficient trading volume to remain a part of a stationary equilibrium.
38Note that assets A1 and A2 are not ρ-orthogonal so that the last statement of Corollary 4 is
not contradicted.
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Example 4: I = 2, J = 2, S = 2, ρ1 = 0.5, ρ2 = 0.5, γ1 = 0.25, γ2 = 0.25,
ω1 = (1, 3, 0)T , ω2 = (1, 0, 3)T , A1 = (
√
2, 0)T , A2 = (1,−1)T , m1 = 0.5, m2 = 0.5,
w1 = 0.5, w2 = 0.5.
The basin of attraction of the point (0, 1) contains the whole square (0, 1)2. Figure
6 illustrates the dynamics of “being driven out” by some trajectories of the dynamical
process.
Figure 6, see section 7.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a novel evolutionary approach to the analysis of innovation
in financial markets. We have superimposed an evolutionary process onto a GEI–
model with restricted participation and have shown that the stationarity and stability
notions known from other branches of evolutionary economics nicely carry over to
our setting. Our results characterize stationary equilibria and give a complete char-
acterization of their evolutionary and asymptotic stability properties. Being based
on bounded rationality, these results are well in line with the empirical literature on
the reasons for the success and the failure of financial innovations.
This paper could only give an introductory treatment of the evolutionary ap-
proach to financial innovation. Further research will have to be conducted along two
main lines.
On the one hand, the simple structure of the model presented could be extended
in various directions. Firstly, the approach could be applied to examples other than
the CAPM. Secondly, further effort could extend the model towards cases not using
the simplifying independence assumptions. Finally, it might be considered whether
consecutive time periods could be linked by more than just the asset dynamics, for
example by feed-back effects of asset trades on the agents’ endowments, by longer-
lived assets, and by more general asset payoffs.
On the other hand, it should be attempted to endogenize the transition function
between the stage economies. As a first step in this direction, Gu¨th and Ludwig
(2000) modify our paper by modeling a process of social learning in a sequence
of CAPM-economies with (endogenously) restricted participation. Their approach
allows to explicitly derive the transition of market participation rates from one period
to the next; in their model, this transition is based on expected utility comparisons in
the sense of imitation and experimentation. It turns out that this transition process
will naturally converge to complete markets – at least, as assumed in our paper, if
there are no a priori upper bounds on the number of assets an agent can participate
in.
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